Key takeaways
- Business email compromise losses reported to the FBI were just over $3 billion in 2025, the second-largest loss category after investment fraud.
- Every change to payment instructions, inbound or outbound, gets a call-back to a number already in the file, never one in the email.
- Two people approve every outgoing wire, and new instructions wait a set period before money moves.
- If money has gone, call the bank and request a recall at once; the FBI's recovery team froze 58% of attempted theft in its 2025 cases.
How the scam reaches a law firm
Law firms move other people's money: settlement proceeds, real estate closing funds, escrow deposits and retainer refunds. That makes them ideal targets for business email compromise, a scheme the FBI describes as targeting businesses and individuals who perform legitimate transfer-of-funds requests[1]. The fraudster does not need to break into the trust account. They only need someone at the firm, or a client, to send money to the wrong place.
The usual pattern runs in four stages. First, the attacker gets into a mailbox, often through a phishing link or a reused password, or registers a lookalike domain one letter off from the real one. Second, they read quietly, learning who pays whom and when. Third, at the moment a payment is due, they send new wiring instructions that look like they come from the client, the title company, opposing counsel or the firm itself. Fourth, the money moves within hours to accounts that are emptied quickly.
The scale of the problem
The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center received 24,768 business email compromise complaints in 2025, with reported losses of $3,046,598,558[2]. Only investment fraud caused larger reported losses that year[2]. Real estate fraud, a category that overlaps heavily with closing scams, produced 12,368 complaints and about $275 million in reported losses[2].
Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2026[2]
Show the data
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| 2023 | 2.95 billion |
| 2024 | 2.77 billion |
| 2025 | 3.05 billion |
Over a longer period the numbers are larger still. An FBI public service announcement counted 305,033 domestic and international incidents with $55.5 billion in exposed losses between October 2013 and December 2023, and noted the scam had been reported in all 50 states[1]. Most law offices are small, with 71.8% employing fewer than five people[3], which means one person often both receives the instructions and sends the wire.
The verification protocol
The FBI's first prevention tip is to use secondary channels or two-factor authentication to verify requests to change account information[1]. Turn that into a written firm rule with no exceptions for seniority or urgency:
Collect instructions once, at the start
Get wiring details for each payee at engagement or when the matter opens, by phone or in person, and record them in the matter file with the date and the name of the person who confirmed them.
Treat any change as suspect
A new bank, a new account number or a request to split a payment triggers the full check, even if the email thread looks routine.
Call back on a known number
Phone the payee using a number from the original file or an independent source, never the number in the email or its signature block. Ask them to read the account details to you rather than confirming yours.
Require a second approver
A second person reviews the verification note and approves before any outgoing wire is released.
Wait before sending to new instructions
Set a holding period, such as one business day, for any payment to instructions that changed in the last week, and tell clients about it in advance so the delay does not surprise them.
Confirm receipt
After sending, call the payee to confirm the funds arrived. Speed matters if something went wrong.
A call-back script staff can use
Staff hesitate to call clients or other professionals to double-check, especially when the email sounds urgent. A script removes the awkwardness:
- Hello, this is [name] from [firm]. We received a message about changing the payment details for [matter or property]. Before we move any money, our policy is to confirm by phone.
- Could you read me the bank name and the last four digits of the account you want us to use?
- Did you, or someone at your office, send that request today? From which email address?
- Thank you. We will send the payment on [date] once a second person at our firm has approved it. If anyone emails you asking to change these details again, please call us at this number.
If the person you call has not sent any change request, stop. Do not reply to the email. Preserve it, alert the payee and treat the mailbox that received it as possibly compromised.
Red flags and the right response
| Red flag | Why it matters | Response |
|---|---|---|
| New account or bank just before a deadline | Fraudsters time requests to closings and settlement dates | Full call-back verification and holding period |
| Sender domain differs by one character | Lookalike domains are a common setup | Compare against the address on file; check full headers |
| Request to keep the change confidential or skip the usual process | Pressure is designed to stop verification | Escalate to the managing partner |
| Instructions sent as an attachment or link from a new service | Links can capture credentials or plant malware | Do not open; call the sender |
| Client says they never received a payment you sent | May indicate earlier diversion | Call the bank immediately and request a recall |
| Mail rules forwarding messages outside the firm | Attackers set rules to hide their tracks | Remove the rule, reset the password, review sign-in logs |
Hardening the mailboxes that handle money
Verification stops the payment; mailbox security stops the attacker from reading along in the first place. Apply these settings first to the accounts of anyone who can request, approve or send funds:
- Multi-factor sign-in on every account, with app-based or hardware methods rather than text codes where the email service supports them.
- Alerts when a new forwarding rule is created or when someone signs in from a new country or device.
- External-sender tags on incoming email, so a message that claims to be from a colleague but comes from outside the firm stands out.
- Domain protections for the firm's own domain, so others cannot easily send mail that appears to come from it. Ask your email provider or IT contractor to confirm these are set.
- A separate, rarely used address or portal for trust account matters, which reduces how often it is exposed.
Remember that the weakest mailbox may belong to the client, a lender or the other side. You cannot secure their accounts, which is why the phone call to a known number remains the control that matters most. Explain this to clients in plain terms when you first discuss how money will move in their matter.
If money has already gone
Time is the only lever. The FBI advises contacting your financial institution immediately to request a recall of the funds, and filing a complaint at ic3.gov regardless of the amount, with full transaction details[2]. Its Recovery Asset Team worked 3,900 incidents through its financial fraud kill chain in 2025, involving about $1.16 billion in attempted theft, and froze about $679 million, a 58% success rate[2]. Those freezes depend on fast reporting.
- Call the sending bank's fraud line and request a recall; ask them to contact the receiving bank.
- File an IC3 complaint with dates, amounts, account numbers and the fraudulent emails.
- Contact your cyber insurer and, if you have one, the breach coach named in the policy.
- Secure the mailbox: reset passwords, end active sessions, remove forwarding rules and review sign-in history.
- Assess client notice duties if client information in the mailbox was exposed, using your breach response plan.
Example: a settlement disbursement saved
Example (fictional): a personal injury firm is about to disburse a settlement. The paralegal receives an email, apparently from the client, asking that funds go to a new credit union account because of a divorce. The thread includes earlier genuine messages, so it looks real. Following the protocol, she calls the client's mobile number from the intake record. The client has sent no such request. The firm preserves the email, the IT contractor finds a forwarding rule on the client's own webmail and the firm advises the client to secure that account. The payment goes to the original account a day later.
Making it part of the engagement
Add a short notice to engagement letters and closing instructions: the firm will never change payment instructions by email, and clients should call a listed number before acting on any message that appears to do so. Repeat it in the email signature of anyone who handles funds. This pairs with the communication standards in Opinion 477R, which calls for reasonable efforts to prevent unauthorized access to client information[4].
Train the people who answer the phones as well. Fraudsters sometimes call first to learn who handles disbursements, or call afterward posing as the client to confirm that the new account was used. Reception staff should never confirm payment details, balances or dates to an unverified caller, and should pass any such request to the responsible lawyer.
Build the protocol into the firm's broader cybersecurity checklist, and if a mailbox compromise exposes client data, follow the notice duties described in ABA Formal Opinion 483.
Frequently asked questions
Who is liable when a client wires money to a fraudster's account?
It depends on the facts, the jurisdiction, the engagement terms and the bank agreements. Firms reduce risk by giving clients written warnings, verifying every change by phone and documenting each step.
Is a call-back to the number in the email signature enough?
No. If the email is fraudulent, the signature block may be too. Use a number from the original file or an independent source.
How fast must we act after a fraudulent wire?
Immediately. Contact the sending bank to request a recall and file a complaint with the FBI's IC3. Recovery chances fall quickly once funds move on from the first receiving account.
Does multi-factor authentication stop business email compromise?
It blocks many mailbox takeovers, but not lookalike domains or a compromised client account. Phone verification of payment changes is still needed.
References
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center (2024). Business Email Compromise: The $55 Billion Scam (Alert I-091124-PSA) (opens in a new tab) โ
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center (2026). 2025 IC3 Annual Report (opens in a new tab) โ
U.S. Census Bureau (2023). County Business Patterns 2023: U.S. detail file (cbp23us) (opens in a new tab) โ
American Bar Association Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (2017). Formal Opinion 477R: Securing Communication of Protected Client Information (archived copy) (opens in a new tab) โ